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ANOTHER VOICE FOR THE “DIALOGUE”: 
FEDERAL COURTS AS A LITIGATION COURSE 
ARTHUR D. HELLMAN* 
“Let it be remembered, also, for just now we may be in some danger of 
forgetting it, that questions of jurisdiction [are] questions of power as between 
the United States and the several states.”1  So admonished former Supreme 
Court Justice Benjamin R. Curtis, speaking at proceedings in memory of Chief 
Justice Taney in 1864.2  Today there is at least one group of people who are in 
no danger of forgetting the point that Justice Curtis made with such force.  No, 
I’m not referring to members of the Federalist Society.  I refer, rather, to law 
school students who take the course called “Federal Courts” or “Federal 
Jurisdiction.” 
It is familiar history that the modern “Federal Courts” course traces its 
roots to the landmark casebook authored by Professors Henry Hart and Herbert 
Wechsler, first published in 1953.3  In their preface to that book, Professors 
Hart and Wechsler wrote: 
  The jurisdiction of courts in a federal system is an aspect of the distribution 
of power between the states and the federal government. . . . Questions of 
 
* Sally Ann Semenko Endowed Chair and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of 
Law.  Portions of this essay are adapted from the Preface to the first edition of ARTHUR D. 
HELLMAN & LAUREN K. ROBEL, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL 
FEDERALISM AND THE LAWYERING PROCESS (2005).  A second edition of the book is scheduled 
for publication in spring 2009.  See ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, LAUREN K. ROBEL & DAVID R. 
STRAS, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND THE 
LAWYERING PROCESS (2d ed., forthcoming 2009).  I am grateful to Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, 
Matthew Hellman, and David Stras for comments on earlier drafts. 
 1. Benjamin R. Curtis, Address to the U.S. Circuit Court in Memory of Chief Justice Roger 
Brooke Taney, (Oct. 15, 1864), 30 Fed. Cas. 1341, 1342–43 (1864). 
 2. Justice Louis D. Brandeis spoke in a similar vein in a conversation with Professor Felix 
Frankfurter in 1923. He said that few of his colleagues on the Supreme Court “realize that 
questions of jurisdiction are really questions of power between States and Nation.”  Mary Brigid 
McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of “Our Federalism,” 27 GA. L. REV. 697, 712–
13 (1993).  Justice Curtis’s remark became a kind of leitmotif in the works of Professor 
Frankfurter.  See id. at 732 n. 224. 
 3. HENRY M. HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM (1st ed. 1953) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER I].  For a tribute to the book that is 
worthy of its subject, see Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688 (1989). 
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jurisdiction, however, bear commonly a subordinate or derivative relation to 
the distinct problem of determining the respective spheres of operation of 
federal and state law.  It is in the effort to identify and to delineate these areas 
of federal and state authority that the nature of federalism and its crucial 
problems are . . . most significantly revealed. . . . 
 . . . . 
  The book deals mainly with these problems of federal-state relationships 
but it also has two secondary themes.  In varying contexts we pose the issue of 
what courts are good for—and are not good for—seeking thus to open up the 
whole range of questions as to the appropriate relationship between the federal 
courts and other organs of federal and state government.  We also pose 
throughout problems of the organization and management of the federal 
courts . . . .4 
The casebook thus took as its starting-point the issues of “distribution of 
power” between the states and the national government that Justice Curtis had 
called attention to almost a century earlier.  But as this excerpt indicates, the 
focus of the book was not only on issues of federalism, but also on issues of 
separation of powers within the federal government and, more generally, on 
what might be called issues of institutional competence.  That approach rapidly 
became the dominant one for the law school course in Federal Courts.  It is 
reflected, to a greater or lesser degree, in most of the Federal Courts casebooks 
that are in use today. 
The Hart and Wechsler approach provides a powerful intellectual model 
for organizing the materials that make up the field of study, and it is hard to 
imagine anyone teaching a Federal Courts course today without drawing 
heavily on that model.  Certainly I would not do so.  I suggest, however, that 
while the elements of the traditional model are necessary to the design of a 
Federal Courts course, they are not sufficient.  The reason can be seen in the 
opening paragraph of the Hart and Wechsler preface.  The preface begins: 
  One of the consequences of our federalism is a legal system that derives 
from both the Nation and the States as separate sources of authority and is 
administered by state and federal judiciaries, functioning in far more subtle 
combination than is readily perceived.  The resulting legal problems are the 
subject of this book.  They are examined here mainly from the point of view of 
the federal courts and of Congress when it legislates respecting the judicial 
system.5 
Thus, from the very outset, the dominant perspective is made clear: The legal 
problems arising out of the system of judicial federalism will be examined 
from the point of view of the institutions of governance—the federal courts in 
 
 4. HART & WECHSLER I, supra note 3, at xi–xii. 
 5. Id. at xi (emphasis added). 
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deciding cases and Congress in considering legislation.  Conspicuously absent 
is the perspective of the practicing lawyer, and in particular the lawyer who 
confronts the legal problems of judicial federalism in the course of litigation. 
Herein lies a difficulty.  Most of the students who take a Federal Courts 
course do not see themselves as future judges or future members of Congress, 
but as future lawyers.  And the reason they take the course is that they think it 
will help them to practice law more effectively on behalf of their clients.  I 
believe that a Federal Courts course falls short if it does not self-consciously 
and aggressively seek to serve that student interest.  Fortunately, it can do so 
without sacrificing either the intellectual rigor or the intellectual rewards of the 
traditional model. 
Lawyers are goal-oriented.  From their perspective, the American system 
of judicial federalism is important because it sets up four possible goals: 
getting into federal court, staying out of federal court, gaining the benefit of 
federal law, or avoiding the detriment of federal law.  A Federal Courts course 
should provide the doctrinal and practical education that will enable lawyers to 
identify and pursue these goals effectively in the service of their clients, while 
assuring that they understand the underlying tensions and issues that will shape 
the law in the future.  In this essay I sketch the elements of an approach that 
builds upon the traditional model but adapts it to the goal-oriented perspective 
of lawyer-litigators.  In brief: 
 The course should be organized primarily on the basis of the tasks that 
lawyers perform. 
 The course should emphasize the differences between federal and state 
courts that lead lawyers to prefer one forum over the other, not only in 
civil rights cases, but in the general run of civil litigation. 
 The course should give heavy emphasis to the centrality of removal 
jurisdiction in civil practice today. 
 Diversity jurisdiction should be given a full measure of attention and 
coverage. 
 The course should make extensive use of problems that ask students to 
achieve particular results for a lawyer on one side of a dispute. 
I do not suggest that these elements are either revolutionary or unique.  
They are not.  But they do reflect an approach that is different in emphasis and 
to some degree in content from the traditional course. 
The exposition in this essay is necessarily brief.  Implementation of many 
of the ideas outlined here can be found in the Federal Courts casebook that I 
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co-authored with Dean Lauren K. Robel and Professor David R. Stras.  The 
second edition of the book is scheduled for publication in the spring of 2009.6 
I.  ORGANIZATION OF THE COURSE 
In many law schools, Federal Courts has a reputation as a difficult course.  
Perhaps this is to be expected; to some degree, difficulty is inherent in the 
subject.  But difficulty need not mean impenetrability, and I believe that the 
law of federal courts can be made understandable without sacrificing either 
depth or rigor.  One of the most useful means to that end is to organize the 
various topics into larger, well-defined units of study.  And if the overall 
approach is to be shaped by the goal-oriented perspective of the lawyer, the 
units in turn should be defined by the various tasks and contexts that set up the 
lawyer’s goals. 
For example, one task lawyers undertake is that of litigating in state court.  
In a state-court litigation, federal questions may take center stage, or they may 
lurk in the background, unseen by lawyers who have not been trained to know 
where to look.  The doctrines that determine the role that federal law will play 
in a particular case will connect in various ways to other bodies of law that 
come into play in other settings.  But the unit of study should be designed 
around the state-court context.  It should encompass all of the doctrines that 
govern the litigation of federal issues in state courts.  These include the Testa-
Howlett line of cases,7 the final-judgment rule embodied in 28 USC § 1257, 
and the adequate state ground doctrine, among others. 
This approach enables the teacher to make and reinforce three important 
points.  First, the litigation of federal issues in state courts is not something that 
happens occasionally; it is a routine part of our legal system.  Second, most of 
the federal claims and defenses that will be familiar to students from their other 
courses have their counterparts in state law, and lawyers who want to represent 
clients effectively must consider both.  Third, lawyers must take care, at each 
stage, not to inadvertently forgo either the state or the federal ground by 
omitting necessary language in a pleading or brief or failing to take the 
required procedural steps.  I like to illustrate the point by comparing Howell v. 
Mississippi,8 in which the defendant lost a possible federal claim by couching 
his brief in purely state-law terms, with Commonwealth v. Kilgore,9 in which 
 
 6. See ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, LAUREN K. ROBEL & DAVID R. STRAS, FEDERAL COURTS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND THE LAWYERING PROCESS (2d ed., 
forthcoming 2009). 
 7. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990). 
 8. 543 U.S. 440, 441 (2005) (per curiam). 
 9. 690 A.2d 229, 230 (Pa. 1997), on remand from Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 
(1996) (per curiam). 
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the defendant forfeited a winning state claim because he did not raise it in the 
lower courts. 
I am not suggesting that the entire course should be organized in this way.  
For example, most teachers will want to introduce students to the landmark 
precedents like Osborn v. Bank of the United States10 and Cohens v. Virginia11 
that define the constitutional limits of the “arising under” jurisdiction.  And 
most teachers will want to spend some time on doctrines of justiciability, 
including standing, ripeness, and mootness.  These topics do not fit easily into 
a task-based approach, and it would be foolish to invent artificial categories in 
order to stay within that framework.  But they are exceptions. 
II.  WHY LAWYERS FIGHT OVER FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
In explaining the approach of their new casebook, Professors Hart and 
Wechsler commented that federal jurisdiction “would surely be a sterile topic” 
if it were not explored as “an aspect of the distribution of power between the 
states and the federal government.”12  Most teachers will agree with this 
observation.  But for most students, it is equally true that federal jurisdiction 
becomes “a sterile topic” if the course does not explain why lawyers fight so 
hard to get a case into federal court or keep it out.  This in turn means that it is 
necessary to spend some time—preferably toward the beginning of the 
course—discussing the differences between federal and state courts. 
Today, most teachers do cover one aspect of the institutional differences 
between the two court systems—the debate over “parity” in the context of civil 
rights litigation.13  The “parity” controversy is important, but it is only part of 
the topic, and a potentially misleading part at that.  For one thing, it 
emphasizes one class of cases among the many in which the choice of forum 
may be of concern to lawyers.14  More important, it de-emphasizes 
 
 10. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
 11. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
 12. HART & WECHSLER I, supra note 3, at xi. 
 13. The classic treatment is found in Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 
1105 (1977).  Professor Neuborne’s basic point, as he later summarized it, was that “a series of 
institutional factors (including procedural differences) combined to give federal courts a 
comparative qualitative advantage for the individual in deciding close constitutional cases, at least 
at the trial level.”  Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 
44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797, 797 (1995) [hereinafter Neuborne, Parity Revisited]. 
 14. Even in the context of civil rights litigation, it is doubtful whether the assumptions about 
state courts that underlie the challenge to “parity” remain accurate today.  As long ago as the mid-
1990s, Professor Neuborne acknowledged that “state/federal qualitative differences no longer 
play the role they played in the 60’s and 70’s in constitutional cases.”  Neuborne, Parity 
Revisited, supra note 13, at 798.  But he “continue[d] to believe that a relative institutional 
advantage for the plaintiff exists in federal court; an advantage resulting from a mix of political 
insulation, tradition, better resources and superior professional competence.”  Id. at 799.  I do not 
know whether Professor Neuborne holds this view today.  In any event, I am not suggesting that 
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developments in the federal judicial system that cut across case types and often 
cancel out the considerations that are typically invoked in the “parity” context. 
This point was brought home to me a few years ago when I gave a talk to 
the Federal Courts section of the Allegheny County Bar Association.  I 
discussed a recent Third Circuit decision in which a local municipality, named 
as defendant in a section 1983 suit, had removed the case to federal district 
court.  I took note of the conventional wisdom that in civil rights cases against 
local officials, it’s the plaintiff who prefers federal court.  I said that if anyone 
in the room happened to be familiar with the circumstances of the case, I’d be 
interested to know the reasons for removal.  Afterwards, a member of the 
audience introduced herself to me as a member of the law firm that represented 
the municipality.  She said it was the firm’s standard practice to remove civil 
rights suits filed against the municipality in state court.  The reason was 
simple: federal judges felt comfortable about granting summary judgment; 
state judges did not. 
Over the years, I talked to lawyers in other parts of the country and learned 
that this perception is widely shared.  Nor is the belief held only by lawyers.  A 
representative expression of the view comes from District Judge Helen Gillmor 
of Hawaii.  Judge Gillmor was asked in a published interview whether “there 
might be some difference in philosophy or case law concerning summary 
judgments in state court versus federal court.”15  She responded: 
That is true.  The federal system has an expectation that many cases or portions 
of cases will be concluded by summary judgment.  The appellate courts are 
very friendly and supportive of having matters decided by summary judgment.  
Because we have more staff than judges in the state court, we have an ability to 
deal more easily with summary judgment.16 
Greater willingness of judges to grant summary judgment is one of the 
most important considerations that lead defendants to prefer the federal to the 
state forum, but it is only one of many.  In 2008, Gregory Joseph, a prominent 
member of the litigation bar, published an important essay with the 
provocative title, “Federal Litigation—Where Did It Go Off Track?”17  Mr. 
Joseph answered the question posed by his title by listing a host of 
developments over a 25-year period.  Among them: 
 
teachers should not call attention to the distinctions emphasized by Professor Neuborne.  The 
point, rather, is that students should also be made aware of the developments discussed in the text 
that have made the federal court a less attractive forum for plaintiffs across the board. 
 15. Ed Kemper, An Interview with United States District Judge Helen Gillmor, HAW. B.J., 
Jan. 2006, at 24, 26–27. 
 16. Id.  Not everyone would agree that “more staff” in federal courts is an important part of 
the explanation. 
 17. Gregory P. Joseph, Federal Litigation—Where Did It Go Off Track?, LITIG., Summer 
2008, at 5. 
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 Greater use of summary judgment motions, spurred by a trilogy of 
Supreme Court decisions in 1986, as well as “the emphasis on managerial 
judging and changes in the civil rules . . . .” 
 The Daubert18 decision and its codification in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, reflecting a skeptical attitude toward expert testimony and a 
strong “gatekeeper” role for district judges. 
 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which “created a 
momentum for parties to seek sanctions against one another 
(predominantly, defendants seeking sanctions against plaintiffs) that did 
not abate even after the mandatory features of the rule were excised in 
1993.” 
 The Supreme Court’s 2007 Twombly19 decision, which “rewrote federal 
pleading requirements” by putting the burden on the plaintiff to make “a 
‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”20 
As a consequence of these rule changes and court decisions (and some 
legislative enactments), “plaintiffs with non-federal causes of action flee 
federal court, and those with federal claims scour the books for state law 
analogues.”21  Meanwhile, “defendants strain to achieve a federal forum.”22 
Your students will be familiar with many of the developments on Mr. 
Joseph’s list from their courses in Civil Procedure, Evidence, and Trial 
Practice, but they may not realize that state courts can and often do adopt rules 
and practices that are more plaintiff-friendly.  One approach would be to go 
through the stages of a typical products liability suit and identify the obstacles 
a plaintiff would face in federal court.  You could then ask: would these 
obstacles necessarily confront a plaintiff in state court? 
But plaintiffs’ preference for the state forum is not simply a consequence 
of the different rules and practices that shape the course of litigation in federal 
 
 18. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 19. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 20. Joseph, supra note 17, at 5.  To be sure, there is substantial disagreement about how 
deeply Twombly cuts into existing law.  But Mr. Joseph’s view is widely shared.  For example, 
one academic commentator has described Twombly as “a remarkable departure from established 
doctrine” that “will frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs with valid claims to get into court.”  A. 
Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 432–33 (2008).  Professor Spencer 
continues by summarizing developments in federal litigation in terms that echo Mr. Joseph’s 
account: 
In the wake of the tightening of summary judgment standards and a narrowing of the 
scope of discovery, as well as the advent of strong judicial case management, the 
Twombly decision has dealt what may be a death blow to the liberal, open-access model of 
the federal courts espoused by the early twentieth century law reformers. 
Id. at 433. 
 21. Joseph, supra note 17, at 5. 
 22. Id. 
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court.  Here we are in the realm of “lore” as much as law, but the realities (and 
perceptions) are no less important.  A few years ago, an article in Trial 
magazine nicely summarized part of the picture from the perspective of a 
plaintiff’s lawyer: 
In most states, local judges are elected by the very people whose disputes they 
will hear, motivating speedy and fair adjudication.  Federal judges are 
appointed for life, and their courts are clogged with criminal cases.  The so-
called war on drugs has so overburdened the federal judiciary that getting a 
civil case tried at all in many federal courts is nearly impossible.23 
The remainder of the article was devoted to strategies that would allow 
plaintiffs “to combat removal attempts.”24 
Perhaps other teachers will have additional suggestions about how to 
present this information to students.  But one way or another, it is essential to 
convey the message stated in the opening paragraphs of the Trial magazine 
article: “Plaintiff attorneys’ preference for state courts is undisputed . . . .  
Defense attorneys . . . upon receiving a state court complaint . . . frequently 
search for any conceivable basis to remove the lawsuit to federal court.”25 
III.  THE CENTRALITY OF REMOVAL JURISDICTION 
When Chief Justice Warren laid down the now-familiar “twin aims” test 
for “unguided Erie choices” in 1965, he said that one of the relevant questions 
was “whether application of the [state] rule would have so important an effect 
upon the fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to enforce it would 
be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court.”26  This formulation 
reflected the widespread assumption in the middle decades of the twentieth 
century that forum-shopping between federal and state court was generally 
something that was done by plaintiffs. 
Today, that assumption is an anachronism, and, from the perspective of 
teaching Federal Courts, a dangerous one.  As has already been noted, it is 
defendants in civil litigation who have a strong tendency to prefer federal over 
state court.  Defendants act upon this preference by removing cases that the 
plaintiff has filed in state court.  The plaintiff, seeking to retain the state forum, 
files a motion to remand.  Disputes initiated by remand motions are central to 
civil litigation practice today.  And the law and strategy of removal should be a 
pervasive part of a Federal Courts course. 
To some degree, this can be done interstitially, in the course of covering 
other subjects.  For example, a leading case on the independent state ground as 
 
 23. Erik B. Walker, Keep Your Case in State Court, TRIAL, Sept. 2004, at 22.  Of course a 
defense lawyer might have a different view of what constitutes “fair” adjudication. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 n.9 (1965) (emphasis added). 
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a bar to Supreme Court review of state-court decisions is Fox Film Corp. v. 
Muller.27  Fox Film sued Muller in state court for breach of contract.  Muller 
responded by “setting up the invalidity of the contracts under the Sherman 
Anti-trust Act.”28  The “federal question” was thus central to the litigation.  
Why didn’t Muller remove the case to federal court?  The answer, of course, is 
that the federal issue came in only as a defense; a federal defense is not a basis 
for original jurisdiction; and removal is possible only if the case could have 
been brought in federal court by the plaintiff.  Fox Film can thus be used to 
introduce students to one of the most important rules that limit defendants’ 
ability to remove. 
Mention has already been made of the Erie line of cases and Hanna’s 
reference to forum-shopping by plaintiffs.  In the Court’s most recent 
application of “the federalism principle of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,”29 the 
Court made clear that Erie principles are equally implicated if failure to follow 
the state rule would encourage out-of-state defendants to “systematically 
remove state-law suits brought against them to federal court.”30  But the 
teacher can point out that nothing in Hanna or its progeny prevents the 
defendant from enjoying the advantage of procedural decisions like Daubert, 
Twombly, and the summary judgment trilogy. 
Interstitial treatment is valuable, but it is not sufficient.  Yet teaching the 
law of removal presents special challenges.  Much of that law involves 
technical rules and narrow distinctions.  Consider, for example, the often-
litigated question of what constitutes an “other paper” which, when received 
by the defendant, triggers the 30-day deadline for removing a case that was not 
removable when filed initially.31  This does not sound like the sort of subject 
that most teachers would want to spend class time on—though when you see a 
case that generates a lively debate between thoughtful judges, you might 
conjecture that it would also produce a lively discussion among students.32 
 
 27. 296 U.S. 207 (1935). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504 (2001). 
 30. Id.  Justice Scalia, the author of the Court opinion in Semtek, had earlier made the same 
point in dissent.   See Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 39–40 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 31. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006) (procedure for removal). 
 32. See, e.g., Addo v. Globe Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 759 (5th Cir. 2000).  In 
somewhat the same vein, there is an intercircuit conflict over the operation of the thirty-day 
removal deadline when the plaintiff sues multiple defendants in state court.  See, e.g., Bailey v. 
Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing the circuit split 
regarding the “first-served” and “last-served” defendant rule, and adopting the latter).  A teacher 
could well spend some class time exploring the tactical choices that plaintiffs and defendants face 
under the competing rules. 
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In my view, it is not necessary to cover the law of removal with great 
thoroughness or even to cover any particular topics beyond the basics.  What is 
important, rather, is to give students a sense of the kinds of issues that arise and 
the kinds of maneuvering that the rules engender.  One area that lends itself 
very well to this kind of instruction is diversity jurisdiction.  To that I now 
turn. 
IV.  TEACHING DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 
When I started teaching Federal Courts, and for many years thereafter, I 
generally gave short shrift to diversity jurisdiction.  Issues involving diversity 
jurisdiction seemed dreary and rule-bound compared with those raised by 
federal-question cases like Mottley,33 Merrell Dow,34 and Franchise Tax 
Board.35  Today I see the matter very differently.  In part, this reflects the 
importance of diversity jurisdiction in everyday litigation and the particular 
centrality of removal.  But diversity jurisdiction also provides numerous 
opportunities to talk about issues of institutional competence and the respective 
roles of the courts and Congress in defining jurisdictional limits.  Moreover, 
the issues of institutional responsibility dovetail nicely with the lessons about 
“gamesmanship” under the existing law. 
The most interesting variety of gamesmanship involves one familiar rule—
the complete diversity requirement under 28 USC § 1332(a)—and one that will 
not be so familiar—the one-year limit on diversity removal contained in 28 
USC § 1446(b).  I start with the complete diversity rule.  The stage is set by 
one of the tactical suggestions in the Trial magazine article quoted earlier: 
Plaintiff attorneys too often focus their attention on “target defendants,” even 
though others may also be liable for their clients’ injuries.  Often, multiple 
entities’ wrongdoings combine to produce a single injury.  These additional 
wrongdoers may be citizens of the same state as your client.  Suing them as 
well as the “principal tortfeasors” can destroy diversity, eliminating federal 
jurisdiction.36 
So the plaintiff, to keep the case in state court, sues a local employee, 
physician, or retailer as well as the out-of-state corporation.  Is there anything 
the corporate defendant can do to counter this tactic?  Yes: the defendant can 
remove and argue to the district court that the in-state defendant was 
fraudulently joined.  But the standard for fraudulent joinder is a very 
demanding one.  For example, in the Eighth Circuit, joinder is not fraudulent 
 
 33. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
 34. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986). 
 35. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 36. Walker, supra note 23, at 24. 
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as long as state law “might impose liability on the resident defendant under the 
facts alleged.”37  And in the Fifth Circuit, 
the test for fraudulent joinder is whether the defendant has demonstrated that 
there is no possibility of recovery by the plaintiff against an in-state defendant, 
which stated differently means that there is no reasonable basis for the district 
court to predict that the plaintiff might be able to recover against an in-state 
defendant.38 
A practice-oriented commentary offers a grim prognosis for corporate defense 
lawyers who believe that an in-state defendant has been joined solely to defeat 
diversity: 
[F]ighting fraudulent joinder requires reasonable preparation and, as a 
consequence, can substantially raise litigation costs.  [The efforts] will 
probably fail under the “no possibility” standard.  Apparently erroneous 
decisions by the district court, moreover, are final because remand orders are 
generally not reviewable by appeal or writ of mandamus.  Even worse, there is 
a possibility that the corporate client will have to pay opposing counsel’s 
attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) in the event that the district court 
determines that the removal was improvident.39 
But from the defendant’s viewpoint, that is not even the worst of it.  Under 
a proviso added to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) in 1988, a diversity case “may not be 
removed . . . more than 1 year after the commencement of the action.”40  The 
one-year limitation offers opportunities for “procedural gamesmanship” that 
plaintiffs’ lawyers exploit to the fullest.  As one district judge wrote a few 
years ago: 
As numerous courts have acknowledged, and both plaintiffs and defendants 
recognize, many plaintiffs’ attorneys include in diversity cases a non-diverse 
defendant only to non-suit that very defendant after one year has passed in 
order to avoid the federal forum. . . . The result is that diversity jurisdiction—a 
concept important enough to be included in Article III of the United States 
Constitution and given to courts by Congress—has become nothing more than 
a game: defendants are deprived of the opportunity to exercise their right to 
removal and litigate in federal court not by a genuine lack of diversity in the 
case but by means of clever pleading.  No one can pretend otherwise.41 
 
 37. Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Foslip Pharm., Inc. 
v. Metabolife Intern. Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 891, 903 (N.D. Iowa 2000)). 
 38. Smallwood v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) 
(emphasis added). 
 39. Jay S. Blumenkopf et al., Fighting Fraudulent Joinder: Proving the Impossible and 
Preserving Your Corporate Client’s Right to a Federal Forum, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY 297, 
310 (2000). 
 40. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016(b)(2)(B), 
102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988). 
 41. Linnin v. Michielsens, 372 F. Supp. 2d 811, 824–25 (E.D. Va. 2005) (citations omitted). 
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The first Vioxx litigation in Texas provides an excellent (and well-
documented) example of this phenomenon.42  The “target defendant” was 
Merck, a New Jersey corporation.  The Texas plaintiff brought suit in state 
court, naming not only Merck but also several other defendants, all of whom 
were citizens of Texas.  These included the doctor who prescribed Vioxx and a 
doctor and research lab who took part in some of the Vioxx studies.  The 
plaintiff waited for more than a year, then dropped the Texas defendants.  
Merck never removed the case, and the plaintiff won a large jury verdict in 
state court (later reversed on appeal).43 
The one-year rule also furnishes a good vehicle for discussing the interplay 
between courts and Congress in framing jurisdictional rules.  In 2003 the Fifth 
Circuit recognized an equitable exception to the seemingly absolute language 
of the statute.44  Other courts have rejected this approach and insisted that it is 
the responsibility of Congress “to curb [the] abuses.”45  In 2005 the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, the administrative policy-making body of the 
federal judiciary, proposed legislation to codify the equitable exception.  There 
was a hearing on the proposal; witnesses endorsed the idea but disagreed about 
how best to word the amendment.46  But the plaintiffs’ bar was not represented 
at the hearing, and (although not solely because of that) the bill died. 
This sequence raises numerous questions.  Among them: Was the Fifth 
Circuit justified in developing an equitable exception in the face of statutory 
language that appears to impose an absolute prohibition?  Should Congress 
have clarified the law rather than allowing the conflict to continue in the lower 
courts?  If so, which of the various proposed approaches best addresses the 
competing interests? 
A class or two devoted to diversity removal, fraudulent joinder, and the 
one-year rule can give the students a good sense of the tactical maneuvers that 
lawyers engage in today to secure the forum they prefer.47  It also allows the 
teacher to raise issues about institutional competence and responsibility that 
are central to the traditional Federal Courts course. 
 
 42. See Federal Jurisdiction Clarification Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 29–32 (2005) (statement of Arthur D. Hellman) [hereinafter Jurisdiction 
Clarification Hearing], available at http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/109h/24607.pdf. 
 43. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Ernst, __ S.W. 3d __, No. 14-06-00835-CV, 2008 WL 2201769, at 
*7 (Tex. App. May 29, 2008). 
 44. See Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 427–29 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 45. Caudill v. Ford Motor Co., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1327 (N.D. Okla. 2003) (quoting 
Martine v. Nat’l Tea Co., 841 F. Supp. 1421, 1422 (M.D. La. 1993)). 
 46. See Jurisdiction Clarification Hearing, supra note 42. 
 47. The one-year rule also offers opportunity for gamesmanship involving the amount in 
controversy requirement. 
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Here’s another example.  Consider this scenario: Anthony Argan, a citizen 
of Texas, brings a state-law tort suit in the state court of New Jersey against a 
single defendant, Pharmacium, Inc.  The defendant is a multinational 
pharmaceutical manufacturer; its state of incorporation is New Jersey.  The 
complaint asserts that the plaintiff was seriously injured as a direct result of 
taking certain drugs made by Pharmacium.  There is no doubt that the amount 
in controversy is in excess of $75,000.  May the defendant remove the case to 
federal district court on the basis of diversity? 
Your answer is likely to be, “Of course not.  The requirements for diversity 
jurisdiction are satisfied, but removal is barred by the forum defendant rule, 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(b).” 
Not so fast! There’s something I haven’t told you: Pharmacium’s legal 
department routinely monitors the electronic docketing systems of state courts.  
Pharmacium thus learned of Argan’s suit before being served with process or 
receiving any other official notification.  Ten days after the filing of the 
lawsuit, Pharmacium removed the action to federal district court. Argan 
promptly filed a motion to remand, asserting that removal was barred by 
§ 1441(b).  Pharmacium has asked the court to deny the motion.  It relies on 
the language of § 1441(b): removal of a diversity action is barred when any 
party “properly joined and served” as a defendant is a citizen of the forum 
state.  If the in-state defendant removes before it is served, Pharmacium insists, 
§ 1441(b) does not stand in the way. 
This argument has in fact been made by defendants in numerous cases 
throughout the country.48  Some courts have accepted the argument, typically 
saying that “the unambiguous text” of § 1441(b) permits removal in this 
situation.49 Other courts have emphatically rebuffed defendants.  In their view, 
“a literal interpretation of the provision creates an opportunity for 
gamesmanship by defendants, which could not have been the intent of the 
legislature in drafting the ‘properly joined and served’ language.”50 
This question is, admittedly, a byway of removal law.  But I think it has 
pedagogical value beyond its narrow context.51  First, of course, it requires 
students—and indeed the teacher—to read the statute with great care.  
Probably all of us have, at one time or another, told students that § 1441 bans 
 
 48. The defendant who makes the argument is not necessarily the in-state defendant. For 
example, in Valerio ex rel. Valerio v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 08-60522-CIV, 2008 WL 
3286976 (S.D. Fla. 2008), the non-forum defendant removed a case also involving a forum 
defendant. 
 49. See, e.g., North v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 
 50. Ethington v. General Elec. Co.  575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 862 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (citation 
omitted). 
 51. The scenario discussed here is drawn from a Problem in HELLMAN, ROBEL & STRAS, 
supra note 6, at 720. 
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removal in diversity cases when any defendant is a citizen of the forum state.52  
But that is not what the statute says.  Second, this maneuver provides an 
example of “gamesmanship” by defendants that pairs nicely with the tactical 
use of the complete diversity requirement and the one-year rule by plaintiffs.  
Third, the issue enables the teacher to revisit (or take up) the competing 
approaches to statutory interpretation represented by the majority and the 
dissents (particularly Justice Stevens’ dissent) in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Allapattah Servs., Inc.53 Finally, the question calls attention to the pressure 
sometimes put on legal rules by technological developments.  Students are 
likely to be intrigued by the ability of defendants to monitor dockets “and 
quickly remove a case prior to being served.”54  Plainly, that is not something 
that Congress anticipated.  But is that enough to justify relying on “the logic 
and policy behind diversity jurisdiction”55 rather than the words of the statute? 
V.  CASE-BASED PROBLEMS 
Upon reflection, it is somewhat surprising that Federal Courts should have 
a reputation as a particularly difficult course.  Why Federal Courts?  Why not 
Bankruptcy?  Or Corporate Tax?  ERISA?  Secured Transactions?  Part of the 
explanation, I think, is that too often the law of Federal Courts appears to 
students as a series of abstractions far removed from any real-life activity.  One 
way to combat this tendency is to devote class time to problems based on 
actual cases. 
The “problem method” has a long pedigree in law teaching, and there is 
considerable elasticity in conceptualizing what counts as a “problem.”  I need 
not enter into that debate here.  The key is the purpose, and the purpose is 
twofold: to send the student back to the governing law (typically the Judicial 
Code and Supreme Court decisions) and to require the student to identify and 
apply the relevant precepts from the perspective of a lawyer seeking to 
 
 52. The Supreme Court, too, has similarly paraphrased the statute.  See, e.g., Lincoln Prop. 
Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 84 (2005) (“Defendants may remove an action on the basis of 
diversity of citizenship if there is complete diversity . . . , and no defendant is a citizen of the 
forum State.”). 
 53. 545 U.S. 546 (2005).  In Allapattah, the Court held that the 1990 supplemental 
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, overruled long-established law under which a party with a 
claim that did not satisfy § 1332’s amount-in-controversy requirement could not sue in federal 
court by joining forces with a plaintiff who did meet that requirement.  The Court relied on the 
“plain text” of the statute.  Id. at 566.  Justice Stevens, in dissent, attacked the majority “for 
ignoring [a] virtual billboard of congressional intent.”  Id. at 575 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The 
district court in the North case found “the Supreme Court’s approach to Section 1367 instructive 
in its analysis of Section 1441(b).”  North, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 1269. 
 54. North, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 1269. 
 55. Allen v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, Civil Action No. 07-5045, 2008 WL 2247067, at *4 
(E.D. Pa. May 30, 2008). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] ANOTHER VOICE FOR THE “DIALOGUE” 775 
accomplish a particular goal in a particular setting—removing a case to federal 
court, avoiding unfavorable state law, etc. 
With rare exceptions, I construct problems based on reported cases.  Often 
I make a few changes in the facts to eliminate peripheral issues, create a 
somewhat closer balance in the arguments on each side, or highlight a 
particular ambiguity in the controlling precedents.  Much of the time, I don’t 
have to look very hard to find good cases; they pop up in United States Law 
Week, Federal Litigator, or other periodicals.  For example, just the other day, 
one article featured a ruling by the Eleventh Circuit56  that applied the Supreme 
Court’s Grable decision57 to a lawsuit growing out of the national debate over 
the regulation of firearms.58  The district court had allowed removal of state-
law negligence and defamation claims on the theory that adjudicating the 
claims would require the court to determine whether plaintiff violated federal 
firearms laws.59  The Eleventh Circuit reversed.  I expect to create a problem 
based on this case; it will require students to closely analyze not only Grable 
but also the predecessor decision in Merrell Dow.  It will also raise the 
question whether Justice Thomas was on the right track in suggesting, in his 
concurring opinion in Grable, that preserving “Smith jurisdiction” is not worth 
the difficulty and litigation costs of cases like this one.60 
VI.  LAWYERS, JUDGES, AND THE “SENSE OF JUSTICE” 
In this essay, I have discussed Federal Courts from a perspective that is 
down-to-earth (perhaps even earthbound) and instrumental.  But it would be a 
mistake to stop there.  The Federal Courts course has an aura—a mystique, 
even—that is unique in the law school curriculum.  (If you are in any doubt, 
read the remarkable review by Akhil Reed Amar of the third edition of Hart 
and Wechsler.61  Can you imagine a love letter to any other casebook?)  This 
special quality comes about in large part because of history—in particular, the 
succession of legendary figures whose writings have defined the field and 
illuminated the issues.  These include Felix Frankfurter, Henry Friendly, Henry 
Hart, Herbert Wechsler, and Paul Bator—to name only some of those no 
longer with us. 
What stands out about these men is that their work combined rigorous 
analysis with passion and often eloquence.  A Federal Courts course should 
 
 56. Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 57. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
 58. See Alyson M. Palmer, 11th Circuit: Federal Courts Lack Jurisdiction over Gun 
Dealers’ Case Against N.Y. Mayor, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT, Jan 2, 2009, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202427143081. 
 59. Adventure Outdoors, 552 F.3d at 1296. 
 60. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 321 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 61. Amar, supra note 3. 
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give the student a sense of that passion—and of the ideals that underlie it.  
There is probably no better example than the climactic moment in Hart’s great 
“dialogue” on the power of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts.62  Hart launches on a searing and powerful condemnation of a line of 
Supreme Court decisions on the rights of aliens: 
  Under the benign influence of [ideas developed in Supreme Court 
opinions], the law grew and flourished, like Egypt under the rule of 
Joseph . . . . [But there] arose up new justices in Washington which knew not 
Joseph.  Citing only the harsh precepts of the very earliest decisions, they 
began to decide cases accordingly, as if nothing had happened in the years 
between. 
 . . . . 
  . . . [T]ake the facts of Mezei, in comparison with its dicta.  The dicta say, 
in effect, that a Mexican wetback who sneaks successfully across the Rio 
Grande is entitled to the full panoply of due process in his deportation.  But the 
holding says that a duly admitted immigrant of twenty-five years’ standing 
who has married an American wife and sired American children, who goes 
abroad as the law allows to visit a dying parent, and who then returns with 
passport and visa duly issued by an American consul, is entitled to nothing—
and, indeed, may be detained on an island in New York harbor for the rest of 
his life if no other country can be found to take him. 
  I cannot believe that judges adequately aware of the foundations of 
principle in this field would permit themselves to trivialize the great guarantees 
of due process and the freedom writ by such distinctions.  And I cannot believe 
that judges taking responsibility for an affirmative declaration that due process 
has been accorded would permit themselves to arrive at such brutal 
conclusions.63 
The interlocutor responds, “But that is what the Court has held.  And so I guess 
that’s that.”64  But for Hart it is not: 
  The deepest assumptions of the legal order require that the decisions of the 
highest court in the land be accepted as settling the rights and wrongs of the 
particular matter immediately in controversy.  But the judges who sit for the 
time being on the court have no authority to remake by fiat alone the fabric of 
principle by which future cases are to be decided.  They are only the 
custodians of the law and not the owners of it.  The law belongs to the people 
of the country, and to the hundreds of thousands of lawyers and judges who 
 
 62. Henry M. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An 
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953), reprinted in HART & WECHSLER I, supra 
note 3, at 312.  Although the title uses the word “dialectic,” the work is universally referred to as 
the “Dialogue.”  See, e.g., Amar, supra note 3, at 696, 704, 714, 715. 
 63. Hart, supra note 62, at 1391, 1395. 
 64. Id. at 1395. 
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through the years have struggled, in their behalf, to make it coherent and 
intelligible and responsive to the people’s sense of justice.65 
Here is the soul of Federal Courts.  And here the lawyers receive equal 
billing with the judges—in fact, top billing.  But this should not be surprising.  
Hart, like Wechsler, Friendly, Bator, and most of the other great figures who 
shaped the domain of Federal Courts, was as much a lawyer as a scholar.  And 
a pedagogical approach that asks students to consider the law from the 
perspective of a lawyer seeking to serve his client’s interests should fit well 
with the focus on allocation of power and institutional competence that is at the 
heart of a Federal Courts course in the Hart and Wechsler tradition. 
 
 65. Id.  Today, of course, few law review writers would allude to the reign of Joseph, and 
none would refer to “a Mexican wetback.”  An additional reason for calling attention to this 
passage is to demonstrate that unconventional and even politically incorrect modes of expression 
are not inconsistent with a commitment to “the people’s sense of justice.” 
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